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CHARLES EVANS HUGHES: THE CENTER
HOLDS
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG*
Over the course of more than two centuries, the Supreme Court
"center" that has attracted the most attention has been that presided
over by Charles Evans Hughes. Yet when Hughes was appointed
Chief Justice of the United States in February 1930, he inherited a
Court that had no center whatsoever.
For years, six conservatives-Chief Justice William Howard Taft,
Edward Sanford, and the "Four Horsemen" (Pierce Butler, James
McReynolds, George Sutherland, and Willis Van Devanter)-had
faced off against three "liberals": Louis Brandeis, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., and Harlan Fiske Stone. They were "liberals" less in the
sense that they approved of social legislation than that they believed
in judicial restraint. In the 1920s, the Taft Court struck down more
laws than the Court had invalidated during the previous half-century,
in what Roscoe Pound called a " 'carnival of unconstitutionality,' "1 to
the accompaniment of what became a familiar refrain: "Brandeis,
Holmes, and Stone dissenting."
Some scholars disapprove of the terms "conservative" and
"liberal," or "right, center, and left," when applied to judges because
it may suggest that they are no different from legislators; but the
private correspondence of members of the Court makes clear that
they thought of themselves as ideological warriors. In the fall of 1929,
Taft had written one of the Four Horsemen, Justice Butler, that his
most fervent hope was for " 'continued life of enough of the present
membership ... to prevent disastrous reversals of our present
attitude. With Van [Devanter] and Mac [McReynolds] and
Sutherland and you and Sanford, there will be five to steady the boat
.... 2 Six counting Taft.
* William Rand Kenan, Jr., Professor of History Emeritus, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill. This article is adapted from a keynote address delivered at the North
Carolina Law Review's annual symposium, Oct. 29, 2004.
1. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN 70
(1968).
2. HENRY PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 1044
(1939).
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Nominated Chief Justice as Taft lay dying, Charles Evans
Hughes was an ideal choice to lead the Court. He brought to the
bench the prestige of the most multifaceted public career of any
American in the first third of the twentieth century. He was,
successively, a relentless counsel for an investigation of insurance
companies in New York state in 1905; an outstanding reform
governor of New York; an Associate Justice of the United States
Supreme Court for, an acerbic critic acknowledged, "six stunningly
liberal years";3 Republican candidate for president of the United
States who in 1916 came within a few thousand votes of going to the
White House; secretary of state under two presidents (highlighted by
a brilliant performance at the Washington arms conference); and a
member of the International Court for Justice.
His experience and his outlook also appeared to equip him to
bridge ideological divisions on the bench. His work as a corporation
lawyer so alarmed Senate insurgents that twenty-six votes were cast
against his confirmation. "Not since Jackson named Taney,"
Hughes's biographer has written, "had the Senate raised such a furor
over the confirmation of a Chief Justice."4 The venerated Nebraskan,
George Norris, who chaired the Senate Judiciary Committee, asserted
that "no man in public life so exemplifies the influence of powerful
combinations in the political and financial world as does Mr.
Hughes."5 Yet Hughes had been aligned with the progressive wing of
the Republican party, had taken a very broad view of the commerce
power in his earlier tenure on the Court, especially in his opinion in
the Shreveport Rate Case,6 and had spoken out courageously in
defense of the rights of five Socialist assemblymen who, though duly
elected, had been expelled from the New York legislature.'
Hughes, in fact, was progressive enough that he soon determined
that the Four Horsemen were uncongenial brethren and that he
would have to look elsewhere to mass the Court. In his first two
years as Chief Justice, he had two new men to gauge. The liberal trio
remained essentially intact when Holmes gave way to Benjamin
Cardozo. The other new judge, Owen Roberts, was more
problematic. He had pleased liberals by his vigorous prosecution of
3. FRED RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES FROM 1790 TO 1955 at 223 (1955).
4. MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 659 (1951).
5. MASON, supra note 1, at 77.
6. Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).




the Teapot Dome malefactors,8 but he had also expressed some very
conservative views. No one could say with confidence where he
would wind up.
Hughes was appointed less than four months after the Wall
Street crash, but his first important influence as Chief Justice was not
on economic matters but on civil liberties, where Hughes's
contribution has not had the appreciation it deserves. Though the
Court had, for the first time, stated that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated the First Amendment's right to freedom of speech in
Gitlow9 in 1925, Justice Sanford's view on incorporation in that case
was dictum.1" The Court had never used Sanford's reasoning to strike
down state legislation until Hughes's opinion in Stromberg" in May
1931. Two weeks later, in Near v. Minnesota,2 Hughes spoke for the
Court once more in a landmark opinion on behalf of freedom of the
press. The division of the Court in this 5-4 ruling was no less
significant. The Four Horsemen constituted the quartet in dissent,
while Hughes had forged a five-judge majority of himself, Brandeis,
Cardozo, Roberts, and Stone.
The great challenge for Hughes, however, in building a coalition
would come not in civil liberties but in responding to the legislation
emerging out of the Great Depression. In the electrifying First
Hundred Days of 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt drove through fifteen
measures that stretched the Constitution, as it was then understood,
to its limits. The two most significant New Deal programs raised the
biggest challenges. The National Industrial Recovery Act authorized
regulation of prices and wages in businesses as localized as burlesque
shows, 3 and the Agricultural Adjustment Act required farmers in
ploughing their fields to limit how many acres they tilled in return for
government subsidies. 4
Even before any of the New Deal statutes reached the Court,
though, it had to cope with emergency legislation enacted by the
states. The first big test for the Court, and for Hughes, was a
8. BURL NOGGLE, TEAPOT DOME: OIL AND POLITICS IN THE 1920S 114-15,144-45,
180-83 (1962).
9. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
10. Id. at 666.
11. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
12. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 703 (1934), repealed by Act of June 25, 1935, ch. 246, § 2, 49 Stat.
375.
14. See Agriculture Adjustment Act, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (1933) (codified as amended at
§§ 601-627 (2005)).
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Minnesota law imposing a moratorium on mortgage payments. 5 It
was hard to see how it could be upheld. The Constitution says
bluntly, "No State shall ... pass any Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts."16 But Hughes also knew the circumstances in which this
and similar legislation had been approved. Beleaguered, debt-ridden
farmers, driven to desperation by the prospect that they would lose
lands that had been in their families for generations, adopted drastic
means to halt foreclosures. In Iowa, a judge was dragged from his
bench and nearly lynched.17 In Nebraska, four thousand farmers
marched on the state legislature.'" In Minnesota, thousands of angry
farmers clogged the streets of the capital until the legislature did their
bidding by enacting a moratorium law.19 Hughes could not doubt that
if the Court struck down the Minnesota act, there would be
formidable consequences.
In the 1934 Blaisdell2 ° case, Hughes came up with a resolution of
his dilemma that was ingenious, though many found it bewildering.
Both state legislatures and New Dealers hoped that the Court would
find justification for questionable statutes by recognizing a national
emergency. Hughes's first response to that expectation was not
promising. "Emergency does not create power," he declared.21
"Emergency does not increase granted power or remove or diminish
the restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved."' But he
quickly added, "While emergency does not create power, emergency
may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power."23 No one at the
time or since has been able to figure out precisely what that sentence
implies, but his words signaled what was to come. By a vote of 5-4,
with Hughes joined by Roberts and the liberals, the Court validated
the Minnesota law. The Chief Justice had apparently put together an
alliance that would take a forbearing attitude toward the exercise of
government power in the crisis of the Great Depression.24
15. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,415-16 (1934).
16. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
17. Frank D. Di Leva, Attempt to Hang an Iowa Judge, 32 ANNALS OF IOWA 340
(1954).
18. See LOWELL K. DYSON, RED HARVEST: THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND
AMERICAN FARMERS 104-06 (1982).
19. CHARLES RUMFORD WALKER, AMERICAN CITY 66-67 (1937); MINNEAPOLIS
TRIB., Mar. 23, 1933; Threat to Confiscate Wealth in Minnesota Made by Gov. Olson to
Force Relief Action, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1933, at 1.
20. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
21. Id. at 425.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 426.
24. The same alliance prevailed in the 5-4 decision in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
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A year later, in one of the early New Deal tests, Hughes faced
another dilemma and again used some prestidigitation to resolve it.
In the spring of 1933, Roosevelt had shocked the financial world with
a dramatic announcement: the United States was off the gold
standard. Congress followed up with a joint resolution rescinding
obligations in public and private contracts.26 When cases made their
way to the Supreme Court, Hughes assigned all three opinions to
himself.2" The toughest of these involved government bonds.28 The
Court could hardly be expected to endorse the argument of FDR's
attorneys that it was acceptable for the United States government to
go back on its word. Yet an adverse decision would add enormously
to the government debt. Hughes might also have sensed, if he did not
know, that President Roosevelt, connected by a private wire to the
chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Joseph P.
Kennedy, was, in the event of an unfavorable ruling, prepared to defy
the Court and precipitate a constitutional crisis.29
Indignant at the notion that the United States government could
refuse to honor its promises, the Chief Justice dismissed the
Roosevelt administration's claim "that the Congress can disregard the
obligations of the Government at its discretion and that, when the
Government borrows money, the credit of the United States is an
illusory pledge," with the terse sentence, "We do not so read the
Constitution."30 Hughes, Paul Freund later recalled, "scolded the
government for repudiating its promise to pay in gold, in a voice that
sounded like that of a Secretary of State rebuking Latin American
banana republics for their repudiations. '31 When Hughes's words
resounded through the courtroom, spectators had every reason to
conclude that the government had sustained a calamitous defeat. But
the Chief Justice was not through. Though the plaintiff was right in
thinking that the government had behaved badly, Hughes continued,
502 (1934), in which Roberts offered a sweeping justification for the exercise of state
power. Id. at 523-24.
25. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL,
1932-1940 at 50-51 (1963).
26. See Act of June 5, 1933, ch. 48,48 Stat. 112.
27. Norman v. Bait. & Ohio. R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Nortz v. United States,
294 U.S. 317 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935). The three cases are
referred to collectively as the "Gold Clause Cases."
28. Perry, 294 U.S. at 346.
29. Draft of message, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers (on file with the Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y., in the President's Secretary's File Supreme Court).
30. Perry, 294 U.S. at 350.
31. Paul A. Freund, The Solicitor General, in THE MAKING OF THE NEW DEAL: THE
INSIDERS SPEAK 101 (Katie Louchheim ed., 1983).
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he had not shown that he had suffered any economic damage.32
Hence, the government prevailed. The ruling was 5-4, and it may
only have been by his denunciation of the government's behavior that
Hughes had retained Roberts.
This was the last time, though, that Hughes was able to keep
Roberts. Less than two months later, in the rail pension case,33
Roberts sided with the Four Horsemen in striking down an act of
Congress, and he was to stay with them for more than a year
thereafter. Not only did the decision appear to foredoom the pending
Social Security bill, but in his opinion for the Court, Roberts took
both a narrow view of the commerce power and a hardhearted
attitude toward labor. If it was in the interest of efficiency and safety
to get rid of superannuated employees, he said, that result could be
achieved not by pensioning off workers who had spent their lives on
the railroad, but, in these desperate times, by firing them.34
In a forceful dissent, which has been called "the boldest,
frankest, indeed, the greatest opinion of his career,"35 Hughes, whose
objections may have been intensified by his recognition that his
coalition had been shattered, chided Roberts for an "unwarranted"
reading of the Commerce Clause that was "a departure from sound
principles."36  The government's authority with regard to elderly
workers, he protested, was not limited to "throwing them out
helpless."37 Hughes concluded, "The power committed to Congress
to govern interstate commerce does not require that its government
should be wise, much less that it be perfect. The power implies a
broad discretion .... "38
At this juncture, something unexpected-and many thought out
of character-happened. His alliance with Roberts and the three
liberals that had hung together most of the time from Stromberg
through the Gold Clause Cases39 having dissolved, Hughes took only a
few weeks to put together another combination-with Roberts and
the Four Horsemen. On what the New Dealers called "Black
Monday," May 27, 1935, three decisions went against the
government.40  Since all three were 9-0, there would seem to be
32. Id. at 101; see also Perry, 294 U.S. at 357-58 (discussing damages).
33. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
34. Id. at 367.
35. The Court Rules Out Security, THE NATION, May 22, 1935, at 588.
36. R.R. Ret. Bd., 295 U.S. at 375 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 381 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 391-92 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
39. See supra note 27.
40. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Louisville Bank v.
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nothing remarkable about Hughes's position. But in speaking for the
Court in Schechter,'41 Hughes was not content with killing off the
National Industrial Recovery Act as an improper delegation of power
but went on to obliterate it a second time as beyond the scope of the
Commerce Clause. Furthermore, he gave a very restricted reading to
the commerce power, drawing upon the much disparaged precedent
of E. C. Knight"2 to speak of "a necessary and well-established
distinction between direct and indirect effects" and quoting with
approval a sweeping statement that neither manufacturing nor mining
were in interstate commerce.43  Deeply alarmed, Roosevelt
admonished the Court for adopting a "horse and buggy" view and
stepped up a search for a way to curb the Court.44
With one foundation stone of FDR's recovery program-the
National Industrial Recovery Act-gone, only the other foundation
stone-the Agricultural Adjustment Act ("Triple A")-remained.
But at the beginning of 1936, the Court, in the Butler45 case, struck
down Triple A in a decision that commentators then and later treated
with contempt. Roberts's opinion, which adopted a Hamiltonian
view of the General Welfare Clause but nonetheless concluded that
the law was invalid,46 drew a scorching rebuke from Justice Stone,
who denounced this "tortured construction of the Constitution.
47
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the ruling was the vote: 6-3.
Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); see
also WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY:
THE NEW LEGALITY, 1932-1968 at 42-43 (1970) (noting the moniker and date of "Black
Monday").
41. Schechter, 295 U.S. 495.
42. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
43. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 546-47.
44. For a transcript of the proceedings, including Roosevelt's provocative "horse and
buggy" remarks, see Press Conference No. 209, 5 COMPLETE PRESIDENTIAL PRESS
CONFERENCES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 309, 336 (1972). For Roosevelt's
explorations of ways to bring the Court to heel, see Breckinridge Long MS. Diary (June
12, 17, 1935) (on file with the Library of Congress, in the Long Papers); Letter from
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Homer Cummings (July 5, 1935) (on file with the Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y., in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Official File
142).
45. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
46. Unlike James Madison, another of the Framers, Alexander Hamilton, believed
that the General Welfare Clause bestowed on Congress broad discretionary powers to
spend. If Roberts had held the restrictive Madisonian view, his conclusion that the Triple
A processing tax should fall would have been readily understandable. Commentators
found it much more difficult to comprehend how Roberts could embrace the expansive
Hamiltonian position but then decide that the government lacked the power to create a
program of farm subsidies.
47. Id. at 87 (Stone, J., dissenting).
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No one could understand how Hughes, who had taken such an
expansive view of governmental power from his first days as
Associate Justice, could sign on to Roberts's opinion or could align
himself with the Four Horsemen.
Some thought the answer lay in Hughes's solicitude for the
reputation of the Court. A story circulated that Hughes had switched
his vote at the last minute in order to avoid the embarrassment of a 5-
4 split on so momentous a matter. According to one account, Justice
Stone chanced upon a former student shortly after the ruling was
handed down. The student, a Yale Law School professor, said he
would like to put a most indiscreet question to Justice Stone. "It's not
contempt of court to ask a question," Stone responded. "Well, to be
blunt, Mr. Justice, did Hughes change his decision in the Triple A
case?" "With a twinkle in his eye," it is said, Justice Stone retorted,
"While I can't answer that, if that were stated as fact, I should be
unable to prove the contrary."48 There is no hard evidence for the
allegation, but its persistence for so long speaks to the conviction that
Hughes was concerned not only with construing the Constitution, but
also, indeed especially, with the fate of the Court as an institution.
The contention that Hughes's vote in Butler required dissection
reflected, too, bafflement with Hughes's serpentine path. The Triple
A decision was not the first time the Chief Justice had formed a 6-3
majority with the Four Horsemen and Roberts. That had happened a
short time before in a Vermont tax case, Colgate v. Harvey,49 where,
by resorting to the long defunct Privileges and Immunities Clause,"
the Court had invited a clobbering from law professors. Hughes's
alliance with Roberts and the Four Horsemen continued after the
Butler ruling in another defeat for the Roosevelt administration,
Jones v. SEC,51 that prompted an eloquent dissent from Cardozo.
During this period of transition for the Chief Justice, Stone confided
to Felix Frankfurter:
Just why we should be afflicted as we are just at present is
another question, but I think there has never been a time in the
history of the Court when there has been so little intelligible,
recognizable pattern in its judicial performance as in the last
few years .... The worst of it is that the one that you find most
48. DREW PEARSON & ROBERT S. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN 44 (1974); see also
ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 414-16 (1956).
49. Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
51. Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936).
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difficult to understand [a reference to Hughes] is the one chiefly
responsible. 2
In May 1936, the commerce power again came within the
purview of the Supreme Court in the Carter Coal53 case. To salvage
something from the Roosevelt recovery program that the Court had
left in ruins, Congress had enacted a "little NRA" for the bituminous
coal industry,54 but the Court, in an opinion by one of the Four
Horsemen, ruled it unconstitutional. Concurring in Carter, Hughes
agreed with Sutherland that "mining ... is not itself commerce" and
asserted that "Congress may not use this protective authority as a
pretext for the exertion of power to regulate activities and relations
within the states which affect interstate commerce only indirectly.
5 6
In another of his articulate dissents, Cardozo said of the "direct-
indirect" formula, "a great principle of constitutional law is not
susceptible of comprehensive statement in an adjective. 57
On the final day of term, the Court jolted the nation by striking
down a New York state minimum wage law for women in Tipaldo,8
with Roberts again in league with the Four Horsemen. This went too
far for Hughes, but he based his dissent on such circumscribed
grounds that when Stone filed a separate dissent, he aimed it as much
at Hughes as at the conservative majority.59 The Tipaldo ruling
incited a furor. One of Roosevelt's Cabinet officers said, "The sacred
right of liberty of contract again-the right of an immature child or a
helpless woman to drive a bargain with a great corporation. If this
decision does not outrage the moral sense of the country, then
nothing will. '"I
The Chief Justice of the United States, once more in a minority,
the Four Horsemen and Roberts dominant, his tribunal the target of
abuse, may well have been tempted to say, with William Butler Yeats,
52. MASON, supra note 1, at 115. Hughes did not always line up with Roberts and the
Four Horsemen. In a 5-4 ruling, striking down the Municipal Bankruptcy Act, he was
with the dissenters. See Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298
U.S. 513 (1936).
53. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
54. See Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-402, 49 Stat. 991.
55. Id. at 297-310 (Sutherland, J.).
56. Id. at 317 (Hughes, C.J., concurring).
57. Id. at 327 (Cardozo, J., dissenting in Nos. 636, 649,.650 and concurring in the result
in No. 651).
58. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
59. Id. at 631-36 (Stone, J., dissenting).
60. Harold L. Ickes MS. Diary (June 2, 1936) (on file with the Library of Congress, in
the Ickes Papers).
2005] 1195
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
"The centre cannot hold.",6' Harlan Fiske Stone wrote his sister:
We finished the term of Court yesterday, ... I think in many
ways one of the most disastrous in its history.... [T]he Court
has been needlessly.., obscurantic in its outlook. I suppose no
intelligent person likes very well the way the New Deal does
things, but that ought not to make us forget that ours is a nation
which should have the powers ordinarily possessed by
governments, and that the framers of the Constitution intended
that it should have.62
On February 5, 1937, President Roosevelt struck back-with an
audacious proposal to add as many as six Justices to the Supreme
Court. 63  His message outlining the plan asserted that change was
necessary because federal courts had not kept abreast of their
dockets, a circumstance, he said, that "brings forward the question of
aged or infirm judges-a subject of delicacy and yet one which
required frank discussion."' Some judges, he went on, "are often
unable to perceive their own infirmities."65 Those words stung, but so
large were the Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress that,
despite a boisterous outcry, the measure was expected to pass.66
Hughes understood that the President's scheme was the most
serious assault ever aimed at the Court, and, after several weeks of
silence, he found an opportunity to employ the immense prestige of
his office as a counterweight. When Senator Burton K. Wheeler of
Montana led off testimony for the opposition before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, he noted that the Roosevelt administration had
repeatedly charged that the Court was behind in its work, so Wheeler
said that he had gone "to the only source in this country that could
know exactly what the facts were. '67 He then startled the audience in
61. William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF
MODERN POETRY 158 (Richard Ellmann & Robert O'Clair eds., 2d ed. 1988).
62. MASON, supra note 48, at 425-26.
63. THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, vol. VI 51-
59 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941).
64. Id. at 53-54.
65. Id.
66. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 135-36 (1995).
67. There are conflicting versions of the episode. See THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL
NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 304-05 (David J. Danelski & Joseph S. Tulchin
eds., 1973); PUSEY, supra note 4, at 755; BURTON K. WHEELER, YANKEE FROM THE
WEST 327, 330 (1962); Memorandum of telephone conversation of Chief Justice Hughes
with Senator William H. King at his residence (Mar. 19, 1937, at 8:45 a.m.) (on file with the
Library of Congress, in the Charles Evans Hughes Papers, Box 6); Memorandum of
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the chamber by announcing, "I have here now a letter by the Chief
Justice ...., Mr. Charles Evans Hughes, ... written by him and
approved by Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Van Devanter. Let
us see what these gentlemen say about it."68 As Wheeler concluded
that sentence, one reporter noted that "a loud ripple of excitement
ran through the hearing room."69
In his letter, Hughes declared, "The Supreme Court is fully
abreast of its work.... There is no congestion of cases upon our
calendar .... ," and "[t]his gratifying condition has obtained for
several years. 70 Increasing the number of judges would mean "more
judges to hear, more judges to confer, more judges to discuss, more
judges to be convinced and to decide," and hence would not expedite
litigation.71 The administration's notion that an enlarged Court might
hear cases in divisions he deemed "impracticable" and
unconstitutional.72 Because of "shortness of time," he had "not been
able to consult" with all of the members of the Court, but, he said, his
statement did have the endorsement of the two senior judges, and he
was "confident that it is in accord with the views of the justices."73
Though Hughes's bold stroke elicited reproach as an
inappropriate advisory opinion and because he did not, in fact, have
the support of the entire bench,74 it was undeniably effective. A
former Ohio Congressman denounced the Chief Justice for "sub rosa
judicial log rolling,"75 and Frankfurter accused him of being Jesuitical,
pretending "withdrawal from considerations of policy, while trying to
shape them";76 but Hughes's statement demolished FDR's crowded
telephone conversation of Chief Justice Hughes with Senator Burton K. Wheeler at his
office in the Senate Office Building (Mar. 19, 1937, at 9:50 a.m.) (on file with the Library
of Congress, in the Charles Evans Hughes Papers, Box 6).
68. Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary: Hearings on S1392 before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 487 (1937) [hereinafter Reorganization of the Federal
Judiciary] (statement of Sen. Burton K. Wheeler) (reading from letter from Charles Evans
Hughes, United States Supreme Court, to Sen. Burton K. Wheeler (Mar. 21, 1937)).
69. Joseph Alsop Jr., Hughes Opposes Extra Justices As Impairing Court's Efficiency;
Brandeis, Van Devanter Concur, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Mar. 23, 1937, at 1.
70. Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary, supra note 68, at 488.
71. Id. at 491.
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. See MASON, supra note 1, at 451-52; Marquis W. Childs, The Supreme Court To-
Day, HARPER'S MONTHLY MAG., May 1938, at 587-88; Raymond Clapper MS. Diary
(May 10, 1938) (on file with the Library of Congress, the Clapper Papers).
75. Young to Meet Morgan, Debate Court Change: Former Congressman Backs
F.D.R. Proposal as Bar Refuses Poll, CLEV. PRESS, Mar. 30, 1937, at 3 (quoting Stephen
M. Young).
76. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Louis Brandeis (Mar. 31, 1937) (on file with the
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dockets rationale. The Democratic national chairman, James Farley,
later wrote that the document had had a "staggering" impact," and
Robert Jackson, who as assistant attorney general had presented the
most cogent argument for Court-packing, went so far as to say that
Hughes's letter "did more than any one thing to turn the tide of the
Court struggle."78
One week later, Hughes dealt another hard blow to FDR's
Court-packing ambitions by speaking for the Court in upholding a
minimum wage law from the state of Washington, which was little
different, in fact not as well drawn, as the New York statute that had
been struck down less than ten months before in Tipaldo. 9 This time,
in the most famous switch in American history, Roberts joined
Hughes and the three liberals in a 5-4 majority that was to prove
enduring.
For decades, scholars have debated why Roberts switched-and
even whether he switched-and the debate is not over yet. We have
long recognized that FDR's Court-packing scheme could not have
been responsible because the vote on West Coast Hotel v. Parrish'
had been taken before the President revealed his plan, though the
plan may well have affected some. of Roberts's later votes. Several
explanations have been offered, with one of the most abiding that at
some point Hughes must have taken Roberts aside and told him that,
for the sake of the Court as an institution, he had to abandon the
Four Horsemen. At a symposium on the Court-packing crisis in
which I participated with Justice William 0. Douglas in the 1960s,
Fred Rodell of Yale Law School remarked, "It was generally
understood at the time that Hughes gave Roberts a third degree of
the sort that would not be tolerated today."81
Library of Congress, in the Frankfurter Papers, Box 28); Letter from Felix Frankfurter to
Franklin D. Roosevelt (Mar. 30, 1937), in ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR
CORRESPONDENCE 1928-1945 at 392 (Max Freedman ed., 1967); see also Letter from
Felix Frankfurter to C. C. Burlingham (June 9, 1937), in ROOSEVELT AND
FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE 1928-1945 at 401-02 (Max Freedman ed.,
1967) (condemning Hughes's letter to Sen. Wheeler).
77. JAMES A. FARLEY, JIM FARLEY'S STORY: THE ROOSEVELT YEARS 78 (1948).
78. Robert Jackson Columbia Oral History Collection; THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL
NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 306 n.50 (David J. Danelski & Joseph S. Tulchin
eds., 1973). But see Richard D. Friedman, Chief Justice Hughes' Letter on Court-Packing,
1 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 76 (1997) (offering a contrary view on the significance of the Hughes
letter). Jackson's contention is unquestionably an overstatement.
79. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
80. Id.
81. Fred Rodell, Remarks at the Marist College Symposium on the Court-Packing
Plan (Oct. 14, 1967).
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We have no documentation of such an episode, though it is
unlikely that if it occurred we would have, but we do know that
Hughes and Roberts had what may very well have been a meaningful
get-together in the summer of 1936 following the Tipaldo uproar. In
her oral history memoir, Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins reports
what her girlhood chum, Mrs. Roberts, relayed to her.82 The
Hugheses, her "very close friend" confided, phoned the Robertses
that summer to say that they were planning to visit Pennsylvania and
were eager to see the picturesque farming country where the
Robertses had a home-a palpable bid for an invitation to spend the
night, which quickly came. After lunch the first day, Hughes and
Roberts went off for a walk. Perkins continues:
Says Mrs. Roberts to me, "All I know is that they walked up
and down that terrace for hours. I said to myself, 'Owen is no
walker. His feet will drop off. What in the world is the Chief
Justice talking to him about so much? Why don't they stop
this?' Twice I called them to come in and have tea, but they
said, 'Just a minute,' and kept right on talking and talking, and
walking up and down on that terrace, which is far enough from
the house to be completely out of earshot, and yet it isn't
actually down in the pasture where the cattle are."
They had a pleasant dinner. Right after dinner Mr. Justice
Roberts said to the Chief Justice, "I want to show you some old
Pennsylvania court records that I've got .... " So he took him
into his library which was at the end of the house, a long way
from the drawing room and living room.... Mrs. Roberts said:
They were in there all evening. Much use we had of them.
Much conversation we had out of those men. Mrs. Hughes and
I talked to each other about the children, the servants, gardens,
the weather, Washington gossip. We got to the end of our rope,
but those two men still stayed in there. They came out finally
and we had a little chat. The next morning the Chief Justice
and Owen went in and talked again in the library.3
What they said to one another over these many hours at a critical
moment for the Court, subjected to savage condemnation for several
of its decisions and with rumors brewing about reprisals Roosevelt
was hatching, we have no way of knowing. But if Hughes did win
82. See Frances Perkins, Columbia Oral History Collection 71-74.
83. Id.
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Roberts over, he may well be regarded as the architect of what has
been called the Constitutional Revolution of 1937.
Contemporary observers noted that it was much easier for
Roberts to change his mind about a state law than it would be for him
to accept the vast augmentation of national power under the New
Deal, but just two weeks after West Coast Hotel he again joined with
Hughes and the three liberals to validate the far-reaching National
Labor Relations Act.84 Hughes took on the Wagner Act opinions
himself. One of the leading surveys of constitutional law has
concluded, "The holding and its reasoning were totally new in
American constitutional law, and made clear the commitment of the
Court to a new jurisprudence. 8' But Hughes, wedded to stare decisis
and the importance of doctrinal stability, never acknowledged that
the Court had switched. He said of Schechter and Carter merely that
"[t]hese cases are not controlling here."86 He even cited the Tenth
Amendment as a barrier to the exercise of federal authority. 7 One of
the closest students of Hughes's opinions, Samuel Hendel, has written
of the Chief Justice:
Having sedulously sought to protect the precedents of the
Court, sometimes at the risk of offending logic, he witnessed
and often participated in the shattering of one precedent after
another. He stood thus as a kind of heroic and, in a sense,
tragic figure, torn between the old and the new, seeking at first
to stem the tide but then relentlessly caught up and moving
with it.
8
West Coast Hotel and the Wagner Act rulings, especially NLRB
v. Jones and Laughlin, set the pattern for the rest of the spring. Not
once was a New Deal law or a state regulatory statute struck down.
In May, the Court, with Hughes and Roberts in the majority,
validated the Social Security Act89 in a manner that illuminates
84. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); NLRB v. Fruehauf
Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58
(1937); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); Wash., Va. & Md. Coach Co. v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937).
85. SWINDLER, supra note 40, at 434.
86. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 40-41.
87. Id. at 29-30 (citing Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 549,
550, 554 (1935)).
88. SAMUEL HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT 279
(1951).
89. Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
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Hughes as a tactician. Roberts and the three liberals wanted to
dismiss the challenge to the constitutionality of the Social Security
legislation for lack of standing, but Hughes allied himself with the
Four Horsemen so that the whole country would recognize that the
Court was now willing to sustain social legislation. 90 When, almost
simultaneously, one of the Four Horsemen, Willis Van Devanter,
announced he was retiring, thereby further undercutting the rationale
for Court-packing, a number of observers attributed his action to
Hughes's influence. The British ambassador wrote Foreign Secretary
Anthony Eden that he perceived "the shadow of a very majestic
figure moving behind the scenes," and one editor wrote another,
"Don't you suppose that Charles the Baptist persuaded Van
Devanter to withdraw?" 91 Two months later, in part because of the
"switch in time,"' the Senate buried FDR's Court-packing plan. The
Court had changed, but it had survived.
What can we learn about the center from this brief foray into the
experience of the 1930s?
First, it can be awfully hard to say precisely what is meant by
"the center," and hence that conception ought to be treated
circumspectly. Virtually every taxonomy of the Court in the 1930s,
including my own, places Hughes and Roberts in the center. But
neither man had a cohesive centrist position. Rather, each oscillated
from one side to the other. To say that they were in the center has no
analytical bite. It is only descriptive, and even the description
requires scrutiny.
Second, in appreciating the importance of the center so
celebrated today in the era of Sandra Day O'Connor, we should not
lose sight of the fact that it is not the center that leads the Court
toward abandoning the old shibboleths but the liberals-in the 1930s,
not Charles Evans Hughes but Harlan Fiske Stone.
Third, before embracing the new dispensation, Hughes, as well as
Roberts, did a good deal of mischief and can even be assigned a role
in bringing on the 1937 crisis. One commentator, John P. Frank, has
written:
90. Inside the Court, ST. LOUIS STAR-TIMES (on file with the Library of Congress, in
the Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Box 7).
91. Letter from R. C. Lindsay to Anthony Eden (May 28, 1937) (on file with the
Public Record Office, London, No. 477, F.O. 371, 20668 (A4108/542/45)); Letter from
Frank Buxton to William Allen White (June 8, 1937) (on file with the Library of Congress,
in the White Papers, Box 189).
92. As the prospects for FDR's bill diminished in the wake of the change in Supreme
Court attitudes in the spring of 1937, Washingtonians circulated a quip that many
historians have adopted: "A switch in time saved nine."
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Once in the Court fight, Hughes' handling of it was superb ....
At the same time, the great blot on Hughes' record is that he
ever allowed the court fight situation to arise. In retrospect, it
was madness to suppose that a people being led out of the worst
depression of our history would stand to have their recovery
blocked by a set of legalisms, and all the more so when the
legalisms appealed, not to some basic tradition of American
liberty, but to feeble precedents and bad logic. Hughes' role in
the Carter Coal case ... and in the AAA case were both
profound failures of judgment.... Under pressure, he beat his
retreat. Why did he not take his eventual ground in the first
place?93
In June, after the Court's term had ended, the conservative,
thoughtful editor of the Boston Herald wrote Frankfurter: "The
President, I assume, will not escape from the conflict unscathed. The
Chief, however, is going to carry more scars than the President when
the Macaulay of a generation or two from now reviews the episode."94
Fourth, the center does, nonetheless, play a useful role in
accommodating jurisprudence to new ways of thinking. The support
of the center on the Supreme Court is vital not merely to provide
votes, but also to legitimate changes in doctrine. To borrow from the
Justices' lyric in the 1931 musical comedy Of Thee I Sing, "Only we
can take a law and make it legal."9 Alpheus T. Mason wrote, with
respect to the Constitutional Revolution of 1937:
The idea of Chief Justice Hughes heading a revolution staggers
the imagination. It is irony beyond belief that he, a jurist whose
primary value was stability, should have sanctioned a
constitutional transformation which, in terms of scope and
speed of execution, is unprecedented in the annals of the
Supreme Court.96
But he did.
Fifth, and finally, quite apart from doctrinal considerations, the
center may be instrumental in safeguarding the Court as an
institution. Certainly Hughes won plaudits for that contribution. The
93. John P. Frank, Book Reviews, 1 J. PUB. L. 138, 148, 151 (1952) (reviewing PUSEY,
supra note 4).
94. Letter from Frank Buxton to Felix Frankfurter (June 7, 1937) (on file with the
Library of Congress, in the Frankfurter Papers, Box 38).
95. GEORGE S. KAUFMAN & MORRIE RYSKIND, WITH LYRICS BY IRA GERSHWIN,
OF THEE I SING 100 (George Jean Nathan ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1932) (1931).
96. MASON, supra note 1, at 124-25.
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Chief Justice's critic, John P. Frank, acknowledged: "What every
aspect of Hughes' activities in 1937 exemplifies is a flair, useful in a
crisis, for skilled public relations.... His letter, yes, but his opinions
and his guidance of general strategy saved whatever was saved for his
faction. '9 7 After the Court-packing plan was shelved, a Midwestern
journalist reflected, "More than one observer believes the real hero,
or villain, to be the quiet, bewhiskered Chief Justice of the United
States, Charles Evans Hughes, who outmaneuvered the President."'9
Afterward, then-Attorney General Bob Jackson told the President,
"'The old man put it over on you .... , Roosevelt had no
comeback.
97. Frank, supra note 93, at 147.
98. F. H. Sterbenz, The World Scene, CLEV. PRESS, July 24, 1937, at 4.
99. EUGENE C. GERHART, AMERICA'S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON 117
(1958).
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